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Abstract: We estimate the impact of public expenditure on Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) and 
the European Social Fund (ESF) on the employment rate using panel data from 28 European countries 
(1985-2011) and an alternative sample of the 17 Spanish regions (1989-2010). The estimations take 
into account the endogeneity of explanatory variables, the dynamic behavior of their relationship and, 
for the set of regional data, the spatial dependence among regions. Results support the hypothesis 
that expenditure in ALMPs and ESF transfers are more beneficial for employment than aggregate 
public expenditure. In addition, countries with larger ESF transfers observe a larger efficiency of their 
ALMPs and employment tends to rise as Spanish regions gain fiscal autonomy.   
 
The efficiency of the European Social Fund and Fiscal Decentralization in Spain. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As the second decade of the twenty-first century started in the European Union, the problems in its 
labor market became apparent1, with unemployment rate exceeding recently ten percent, far above 
other developed regions of the world. In addition it is also becoming evident that asymmetries in 
unemployment levels do not only persist, but become wider as the economic crisis hits the continent. 
These asymmetries appear mainly, but not only, across the different Member States. There is a gap of 
twenty percentage points between the two Member States with the larger and lower unemployment 
rates. But asymmetries arise also across other dimensions of the labor market, which provokes that, 
despite the fact that more than 26 million people are unemployed in the European Union, there are 
significant skill mismatches on Europe’s labor market that make, paradoxically, that a large level of 
unfilled vacancies still persists.  
 
Youth unemployment rate is more than twice as high as the adult one. The European Union seems 
determined to undertake policy actions in order to rectify this trend, and the 8 February 2013 
European Council proposed to carry out the Youth Employment Initiative, that is intended to support 
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 Information and data mentioned in the Introduction have been extracted from Eurostat and European Commission (2013) 
young unemployed citizens in regions with particularly high level of youth unemployment rate (above 
25%). For this purpose, the European Council has allocated a budget of €6 billion for the period 2014-
2020, half of which will be channelled through the European Social Fund.  
 
At this stage, it is important to identify to which extent active labour market policies, in general, and 
the European Social Fund, in particular, have been determinant to set aside rigidities in the labor 
market in the past. The European Social Fund was established with the signature of the Treaty of 
Rome, and its importance as a fiscal and a policy tool has been increasing, in parallel to the other 
Structural Actions. The raising importance of the ESF and the active labour market policies that the ESF 
is intended to boost, make imperative the necessity of identifying under which conditions they are 
more effective, and to construct methods able to measure their impact on the labor market and other 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
This paper aims to respond to that necessity. For this purpose, we construct and estimate an 
econometric model that evaluates whether the level of public expenditure on active labour market 
policies in Europe responds properly to the macroeconomic environment. In order to determine so, we 
estimate the impact of such public expenditure on the employment rate using panel data from the EU 
member states for the period 1985-2011. We try to identify also the importance of the European 
Social Fund by discriminating the data from countries highly subsidized by the ESF from those countries 
that perceive relatively less funds.  
 
But the paper also intends to shed light in another unexplored issue. The level of vertical distribution 
of the public administration is extremely heterogeneous across the twenty-seven EU Member States. 
Fiscal policies are more decentralized in some countries, and we want to explore whether this situation 
affects the effectiveness of ALMP and, therefore, the impact of the ESF. For this purpose, we make use 
of Spanish regional data, as Spain has experience a process of fiscal decentralization during the last 
decades observing a significant transfer of fiscal competencies from the national to regional 
governments. This process has not affected all regions simultaneously nor in the same proportion, 
which converts this case in a particularly interesting natural experiment on the process of vertical 
transfer of fiscal power. 
 
 
Using panel-data at the regional level (1989-2010) from the seventeen Spanish regions, we estimate 
the impact of several macroeconomic variables on the employment rate. Among the set of explanatory 
variables, we include an index the level of fiscal autonomy gained for each Spanish region, in order to 
estimate its importance as a determinant of employment. We also explore its iteration with other 
variables and the presence of spillover effects among regions.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the main figures governing the evolution of the 
European Social Fund since its creation, from a fiscal perspective. It also includes a subsection 
illustrating its evolution in Spain from regional data; Section 3 describes challenges and results of 
previous studies using panel-data models to analyze the impact of ALMPs on unemployment which are 
considered relevant for the design of our model; Section 4 described the variables used and present 
the data; Section 5 explains the methodology applied and the results obtained; and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The European Social Fund as a fiscal tool 
 
The European Social Fund (ESF) is the oldest of the Structural Funds and its creation was stated in the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, with the original task of promoting within the Community employment 
facilities and the geographical and occupational mobility of workers. The ESF was founded upon the 
principles of its predecessor in the European Coal and Steel Community, the Fund for the Retraining 
and Resettlement of Workers. During its first two decades, due to the low levels of unemployment in 
the European Economic Community, the ESF was devoted to facilitate migration of workers and to 
retrain people who had suffered accidents at work2. The importance of the European Social Fund on 
the European Communities budget was fairly minor during this period, representing around 1% of the 
total budget and less than 0.01% of GDP3. 
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 European Commission (2007) 
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 The Structural Funds represented altogether around 5% of the total European Communities budget during the sixties 
(European Communities 2009), which in turn represented around 0.5% of the GDP of the 6 member states.   
Figure [1]: The share of the Structural Funds in the European budget 
 
source: EU budget financial report (several years) 
 
The first reform of the ESF in 1971, increased notably the size of the Fund and intended to target the 
funding towards particular groups and categories of people. The Fund was therefore, oriented towards 
two types of intervention: regions with particular difficulties due to restructuring or industrial change 
caused by Community policies and less developed regions. In 1975 was created the European Regional 
Development Fund devoted to promote infrastructure in regions lagging behind. The ESF and ERDF 
were referred to as “Structural Funds”. Although the next reform was foreseen for the early eighties, 
the deterioration in the employment situation led to prior amendments of the rules governing the ESF 
in 1977 and 1978, giving increasing attention to less developed regions and including additional aid to 
some population groups in risk of exclusion from the labor market.  
 
Figure [2]: The allocation of the ESF: 1974-1982. Distribution among Member States and average 
annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita ECU) 
 
source: Commission of the European Communities (1983), Report and proposals on ways of increasing the effectiveness of 
the Community´s structural Funds, Brussels, OPOCE COM (83) 501 (Commitments) 
 
At the beginning, Member States implemented projects that were re-funded afterwards, but, as access 
to Fund started to cover wider policy areas, a system of prior approval was put in place. Still, until the 
1988 reform, there was little supranational influence over the particular projects and implementation 
of the ESF and the other funds (Bache et al. 2011).  Although in absolute terms Italy, the United 
Kingdom and France were the main beneficiaries of the allocation of the ESF during these years, the 
allocation of funds per inhabitant were clearly focused towards Ireland whose advantage over the 
other Member States was remarkable.   
 
In the eighties, following the 1979 energy crisis, with unemployment arising as a severe problem –in 
particular youth unemployment- and some regions in the need of industrial or agricultural 
reconversion, the ESF was reformed in order to include workers from all areas of the economy. In the 
view of the economic disequilibria emerging from the accession of the three new Member States of 
the eighties, in 1983 it was decided that funding from the ESF should be focused on the assistance to 
poorer regions in order to reduce the imbalances within the European Union. (European Commission 
1998; 2007) 
 
 
Figure [3]: The allocation of the ESF: 1984-1987. Distribution among Member States and average 
annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita ECU) 
 
 
  
source: Commission of the European Communitites (1989), Guide to the reform of the Community´s structural Funds, 
OPOCE: Brussels ISBN: 92-826-0029-7 (Commitments) 
 
The size of the Fund was consequently enlarged, as Portugal and Greece became quickly among the 
main recipient states, with Ireland still receiving an outstanding per capita contribution in comparison 
to the remaining Member States. 
 
The ESF was substantially reformed in 1988, together with the other Structural Funds, with the 
purpose of moving from individual projects to multiannual partnerships between the Member States 
and the Commission. This reform also included an increase on the financial weight of the ESF. The new 
approach was built on four basic principles: Concentration, which was applied in various ways, such as 
in determined regions or policy objectives; partnership, with national, regional or local authorities; 
programming, involving national and regional authorities together with the European Commission and 
setting the priorities and allocation for each period (5-7 years); and additionality, as the funds were not 
intended to replace but to increase national funds. 
 
Figure [4]: The allocation of the ESF: Programming period 1989-1993. Distribution among Member 
States and average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita ECU) 
 
  
source: Commission of the European Communitites (1990), Annual report on the implementation of the reform of the 
Structural Funds 1989, Brussels EC (COM(90) 516 final). (Initial allocation of funds) 
 
 
In 1992 the single market had reached its completion and the way towards the single currency was 
clearer. Nevertheless, unemployment had resumed its upward trend after the some steady years in 
the late eighties. The review of the Structural Funds in 1993 was focused towards strengthening 
economic and social cohesion, and the budget for the Structural Funds was almost doubled for the 
period 1994-1999 in comparison to the period 1988-1993.  The Cohesion Fund was introduced to help 
poorer EU countries in developing infrastructures, while the Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG) targeted restructuring in the fisheries sector. The European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), in existence since 1962, invested in the development of the agricultural 
sector.  The ESF was targeted to increasing competitiveness and preventing unemployment through 
education and training activities focused on workers with higher risk of exclusion, such as young job-
seekers or long-term unemployed, within the framework of the Commission´s White paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment.  
 
Figure [5]: The allocation of the ESF: Programming period 1994-1998. Distribution among Member 
States and average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita Euro) 
 
  
source: European Commission (1999), The Structural Funds in 1998 Tenth annual report, OPOCE: Brussels COM(99) 467 
final (Commitments) 
 
The ESF was geared towards supporting the European Employment Strategy as a part of the Lisbon 
Strategy at the beginning of the twenty first century. The ESF would then target the four pillars of the 
European Employment Strategy: enhancing the skills and flexibility of the workforce; development of 
active labor market measures in order to prevent youth long-term unemployment; development of 
small and medium sized enterprises by enhancing entrepreneurship potential; and promote equal 
opportunity and prevent social exclusion within the labor market.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure [6]: The allocation of the ESF: Programming period 2000-2006. Distribution among Member 
States and average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita Euro) 
 
 
source: Commission of the European Communities (2004), 15th Annual report on the implementation of the Structural 
Funds 2003, brussels COM(2004) 721 final (Initial allocations) 
 
The programming period 2007 2013 includes substantial reorganization of the Cohesion Policy. The 
former EAGGF and FIFG, now replaced by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and the Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) respectively, are no longer 
involved in the cohesion policy, while the Cohesion Fund will participate in the Convergence objective 
instead of functioning independently as it did before. The rules have been simplified and the Funds are 
targeted specifically towards the promotion of competitiveness and employment creation. The link of 
the ESF with the European Employment Strategy is strengthened and the Fund priorities are centered 
in convergence and employment objectives (European Commission 2007b).  
 
Figure [7]: The allocation of the ESF: Programming period 2007-2013. Distribution among Member 
States and average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita Euro) 
  
source: ESF Database portal at http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=440&langId=en#opt1 (ESF Initial financial 
allocations as at 31.12.2007) 
 In sum, the European Social Fund has increased notably its presence in the European economy, not 
only through its raising presence in the EU budget, as shown in Figure [1], but mostly as its importance 
on the total European economy has followed a slow but steady upward trend. The European Social 
Fund allocates today over 13 trillion Euro, representing on average around 0.07 % of the European 
economy.    
 
Figure [8]: Evolution of the European Structural Funds (as a share of GDP in the European 
Communities/ European Union)  
 
 
source: Self elaborated from data in: EU budget (several years) Financial Report, Eurostat and OECD  
 
The chart above illustrates how this trend has been common to other Structural Actions, which in 
aggregate have raised to represent –inclusive of the Cohesion Fund- near half a percentage point over 
total GDP during the last two decades.  
 
2.b The distribution of the European Social Fund in Spain, a regional perspective 
 
Spain joins the European Communities in 1986, simultaneously to Portugal. In contrast to the ERDF, 
there was no “a priori” distribution of the ESF among Member States (apart from the fact that part of 
the budget was reserved for “absolute priority” territories, which included Greece, Portugal, Ireland, 
Northern Ireland, the French overseas territories, the Italian Mezzogiorno, and 7 Spanish Autonomous 
regions –Andalusia, Canary Islands, Castile and Leon, Castile La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia and 
Murcia) plus Ceuta and Melilla) in these years. In addition, the projects were submitted by the 
Member states and evaluated by the European Commission individually. Therefore, the final allocation 
of the ESF during these years is greatly a consequence of the absorptive capacity of the public 
administration. (Dominguez González 1989) 
 
Figure [9]: Distribution of the European Structural Funds among Spanish regions. 1986-1988 
 
  
Source: Dominguez Gonzalez (1989), "El fondo social europeo y España", Política Social y Comunitaria no. 4-5 and INE 
(Spanish National Statistical Office) 
 
Seven over the seventeen Spanish regions were considered “absolute Priority” regions in 1986 in line 
with the regulations of the ESF. The ten remaining regions were considered “Priority” regions, which 
also entitled them to access the ESF funds due to high unemployment rates or economic restructuring.   
 
Figure [10]: Distribution of the European Structural Funds among Spanish regions. Programming period 
1989-1993 
 
  
Source: 5th annual report on the implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds (1993) and INE 
 The programming period 1989-1993 included a new classification of the European territory according 
to the targeted objective of the Structural Funds, being the Objective 1 regions equivalent to the 
former AR regions representing less developed areas inside the community. The objective 2 regions 
were those suffering process of reconversion due to industrial decline. The objective 3 was to fight 
against long-term unemployment while the objective 4 was to promote the inclusion of young people 
in the labor market. Finally, objective 5 was targeted to the development of rural areas. The European 
Social Fund was the only one of the Structural Funds that would participate in the development of all 
five objectives.  
 
The aid would no longer be distributed through individual applications, but the Member States will 
now propose multiannual plans to the European Commission which include the use of all Structural 
funds in their territory. Ten Spanish regions were considered objective 1 for this programming period, 
while one region was considered objective 2.  
 
Figure [11]: Distribution of the European Structural Funds among Spanish regions. Programming period 
1994-1999 
  
Source: European Communities (1998) and INE 
 
 
The distribution of the ESF along Spanish regions during the next programming period (1994-1999) was 
fairly similar to the previous period. Again, the level of breakdown of the data collected for the share 
of the ESF allocated under objective 3 and 4, which represent a significant share of total fund, does not 
allow observing the territorial distribution across different regions. 
 
For the period 2000 2006, the former objective 5b was now included in the objective 2 while former 
objective 3 and 4 were merged in the new objective 3. Otherwise, the budget, main objectives, co-
financing rates and supervision remained almost unchanged. The focus of the ESF in Spanish objective 
1 regions became more accused during these years.  
 
Figure [12]: Distribution of the European Structural Funds among Spanish regions. Programming period 
2000-2006 
 
  
Source:  E Commission (2007c) and INE 
 
 
The programme 2007 2013 redesigned the objectives again in order to adapt the Structural Actions to 
the incorporation of new member states to the EU. Spain have 4 convergence regions (Galicia, 
Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha and Andalusia, with a GDP per head of less than 75% of the EU-25 
average) and two phasing-out regions, plus two autonomous cities (Asturias, Ceuta, Melilla and 
Murcia, with a GDP per head of more than 75% of the EU-25 average but of less than 75% of the EU-15 
average). The remaining are the three phasing-in regions (Castilla and Léon, Valencia and the Canary 
Islands, with a GDP per head of less than 75% of the EU-15 average in the period 2000-2006 but more 
than 75% of the EU-15 average for the period 2007-2013) and the eight regional competitiveness and 
employment objective regions (Catalonia, Aragon, Madrid, la Rioja, Navarra, Basque Country, 
Cantabria and Balearic Islands, that have a GDP per head of more than 75% of the EU-25 average). 
More than half of the ESF was spent in Convergence objective regions during the period 2007 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure [13]: Distribution of the European Structural Funds among Spanish regions. Programming period 
2007-2013 
 
  
Source: ANUARIO DE ESTADÍSTICAS DEL MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO E INMIGRACIÓN (several years), retrieved at 
http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/estadisticas/contenidos/anuario.htm 
 
 
The data presented so far represent the geographical distribution of the ESF according to the different 
administrative status that Spanish regions have been assigned in the several programming periods for 
the distribution of the Structural Actions. Nevertheless, these data are territorialized irrespectively of 
the level of the public administration that undertake the project financed by the ESF.  
 
Generally, all levels of public administrations, local, regional and national, are involved in projects 
financed by the Structural Funds. But the Spanish economy has went through a fiscal decentralization 
process since its adhesion to the European Union which is not common to other EU Member States4, 
and which is mainly associated with a transfer of fiscal autonomy from the central to the regional 
government. Due to this decentralization process, Spanish regional governments have also gained 
additional control over the administration of the Structural Funds at the cost of a lower importance of 
the central government. 
 
The following chart illustrates this phenomenon for the case of the ESF. Immediately after joining the 
European Union, Spanish regional governments controlled around 10% of the ESF transfers from the 
EU to Spain, while during the last programming period this share has climbed to over 40%.  
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 See, for example, Molero (2002) and González-Alegre (2010) 
Figure[14] : The European Social Fund in Spain: Evolution of the share of the ESF distributed to regional 
government to the total ESF allocated to Spain 
  
 
Self-elaboration from data shown in previous figures and variable EFS 
 
But this decentralization process has not been symmetric. As illustrated by González-Alegre (2010b), 
Spanish regional governments have not gained an homogeneous level of fiscal autonomy among them, 
and the process of transferring competencies from the central to regional governments have not been 
simultaneous either.  
 
The Spanish Constitution discriminates between two types of regions: the so-called "historic 
nationalities" or regions with a high level of competencies, described in the article 143 of the Spanish 
Constitution5 and the ten remaining regions6 (and the two autonomous cities) that in principle assume 
a lower level of competencies, and are described in the article 151 of the Constitution. Each region has 
its own Statute of Autonomy that defines the activities in which the regional government is competent 
to legislate and govern. In practice, the regions with high levels of competencies experienced a higher 
level of decentralization in the beginning, but the differences have been reduced as long as the 
decentralization process has been taking place. The variety of fiscal competencies is also more 
heterogeneous among the group of “historic nationalities” (art.  143) than among the group of regions 
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 Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Comunidad Valenciana.  
6
Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile La-Mancha, Castile and Leon, Comunidad de Madrid, Extremadura, 
Murcia and La Rioja.  
with low level of competencies. 
 
The following chart illustrates the extent to which this situation affects also the administration of the 
ESF. As there are no significant differences in the level of per capita income among both groups of 
regions, or in other macroeconomic variables nor geographical concentration, the differences 
observed respond mostly to the level of fiscal autonomy of the regional governments. We can observe 
how “historic nationalities” have administrated a larger share of the ESF in their territories in 
comparison to the remaining regions, both as a share of GDP and in per capita terms.  
 
 
Figure[15] : The European Social Fund in Spain: Evolution of the share of the ESF distributed to regional 
government to the total ESF allocated to Spain 
 
 
 
Self-elaboration from data shown in previous figures and variable EFS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Modeling the impact of active labor market policies 
 
 
Several panel data studies tried to identify the impact of active labor market policies on employment 
indicators during the nineties. Jackman et al. (1990), for example, find for a panel of 14 OECD 
economies during the period 1970-88 that active ALMP have a significant impact on unemployment 
(Other studies are Layard et al. 1991; Zetterberg 1995). OECD (1993) reveals that previous results are 
sensitive to the measure of ALMP, so that when this variable is expressed as a ratio over the number of 
unemployed, it could be highly correlated with the dependent variable (unemployment rate) leading 
to spurious correlation. Forslund and Krueger (1997) also made a critical revision of previous 
estimations in which they identified a source of simultaneity bias between unemployment and 
expenditure on ALMP and a possible change in the relationship between both variables during the 
nineties. Elmeskov et al. (1998) address the simultaneity bias by averaging their indicator of 
expenditure in ALMP over the whole period, while Nickell and Layard (1999) use one period lagged 
values of expenditure in ALMP. In both cases, the impact of ALMP in unemployment seems less 
relevant than in previous studies.  
 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) interact labor market institutional variables with adverse shocks, in the 
form of time dummies for five-year averaged variables, to conclude that the heterogeneity observed in 
unemployment among OECD countries depends on the interaction of common shocks with 
idiosyncratic institutional variables (the interaction of institutional variables is widely analized in 
Basasini and Duval 2009), among which the size of ALMPs is included. The branch of the literature 
focusing its attention to the institutional determinants of unemployment has been quite prolific during 
the first decade of twenty first century (see, for example, Baccaro and Rei 2005; Nickel et al. 2005; 
Sachs 2012) and their results have motivated the inclusion of institutional variables among the set of 
controls in studies analyzing the impact of ALMP. 
 
Other studies based in a matching-function approach (Hujer and Caliendo 2000; Hujer and Zeiss 2003) 
relate the number of hirings to the number of vacancies, unemployed and other control variables, 
among which ALMP are included. The use of an indicator of the outflows from unemployment to 
employment as the dependent variable has the advantage that this variable internalizes the 
displacement effects (crowding-out) of ALMP, that is, it accounts also for the substitution of workers 
provoked by the policy.  
 
Estevao (2007) estimates the determinants of employment rate in the private sector and includes 
expenditure in ALMP as a share of GDP, arguing that normalizing this variable by unemployment might 
biass the results because aggregate output shocks could affect both variables simultaneously 
provoking spurious correlation. He concludes, for a panel of 15 OECD countries (1985-2000) that ALMP 
were very effective in increasing business employment rates in the 1990s.   
 
Boone and van Ours (2009) discriminate among several types of ALMP in a panel data of 20 OECD 
countries (1985-1999) and conclude that the impact on unemployment (and on the 
employment/population rate) varies significantly among categories of ALMP.   
 
 
3.b Regional Studies and asymmetry of policies 
 
The number of studies estimating the impact of ALMP in a single country using panel data models for 
regional and local level variables has been quite prolific in some particular countries motivated by the 
availability of data and the focus of public policies. (In general the existence of macroeconomic 
estimations is usually correlated with the presence of microeconomic level evaluations) 
 
In the early nineties, Sweden implemented an aggressive program of ALMP to fight rising 
unemployment. This policy generated a considerable amount of research (which is summarized in 
Calfmors et al. 2002). Regarding macroeconomic studies for regional panel data models, Calmfors and 
Skedinger (1995) estimate the impact of job creation and training policies in Swedish regions 
controlling for simultaneity bias. Their results are more optimistic with respect to job creation policies 
than for training policies. They estimate a panel data model in which the dependent variable is the 
unemployment rate and the ALMP are expressed as a ratio of treated individual over the total amount 
of “treatable” (unemployed) population. The set of control also included time and regional dummies 
and the national unemployment rate.   
 
 
 
Another country in which research on the implementation of ALMPs has been extremely prolific in the 
view of the extended availability of data is Germany, in particular in the view of the importance that 
these policies reached after the reunification. Hujer et al. (2002) and Hujer et al. (2004) regress the 
total rate of job seekers on a vector containing the measure for ALMP and other explanatory variables, 
using panel data from 175 German labour districts. They represent ALMP as the accommodation ratios 
of the programs, which are defined as the sum of programme participants relative to the stock of job 
seekers. They use OLS and System GMM. They find a negative impact of ALMP on the rate of the job 
seekers in the short run, while the long-run effects are less clear. Hagen (2003) estimates, in addition, 
the impact of ALMPs on the flow from unemployment to employment (i.e. the matching function 
approach) and the impact on regular employment from regional-level data. His results are not 
extremely optimistic and he is able to find a negative impact of public training measures in the 
matching efficiency (the matching function approach was previously used by Boeri and Burda (1996) 
for a panel of 76 Czech employment office districts and quarterly data).  
 
There are very few studies relating the impact of ALMP to the level of fiscal decentralization. Lundin 
and Skedinger (2006) estimate, from microeconomic level data, the relationship between 
decentralization and effectiveness of ALMPs in Sweden. Using data from a governmental program in 
1996, they conclude that decentralization stimulates the number of public initiatives, in particular 
those targeted to outsiders and relief works.  
 
Altavilla and Caroleo (2006), estimates a dynamic panel data model and a panel VAR model using 
quarterly data from 20 Italian regions. Their results discover significant differences in the impact of 
ALMP between northern and southern regions, probably due to the differences in the economic 
structure of both groups of regions. The results in Altavilla and Caroleo (2011) reinforces their previous 
findings using factor-augmented vector autoregression techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Data and Variables  
 
4.1 Country-level data 
 
We use country-level yearly data in order to estimate the impact of Active Labour Market Policies on 
the employment rate. For this purpose, we use data from an unbalanced panel of 28 European 
countries for the time period 1985-2012. Variable description and sources are described in tables [1] 
and [2]. The dependent variable is the employment rate in the population aged 16-64, and it has been 
retrieved from the EUROSTAT database, although some observations have been extracted from the 
“Population and Labor Force” dataset which is part of the “Annual Labor Force Statistics” (ALFS) 
compiled by the OECD (the compatibility between both sources has been examined on the basis of 
simultaneous observations).  
 
The first decision to take when building a model that tries to estimate the impact of ALMP is the 
selection of the dependent variable to be included in the model. Originally, most studies7 used the 
unemployment rate. However, Scarpetta (1996) finds that ALMPs may increase the labor force 
participation rate, which suggests that the use a ratio of unemployed people over working age 
population8 would capture more accurately the desired effect (Nickell and Layard 1999).  Hujer et al. 
(2004) use the rate of job seekers expressed as the ratio between unemployed plus participants in 
ALMP over the total labor force. Estevao (2007) use the share of working age population employed in 
the business sector (employment rate in the business sector). OECD (1993) use the employment rate. 
Altavilla and Caroleo (2006) use alternatively unemployment rate, employment rate and youth 
unemployment rate. Hujer and Zeiss 2003, instead, use the outflow from unemployment into regular 
employment relative to the labor force in order to internalize also displacement effects. Hagen (2003) 
uses the unemployment rate, the matching function approach as in Hujer and Zeiss (2003) and the 
ratio of regular employment to the labour force as three alternative dependent variables to be 
analyzed. Inspired by the analysis of this literature, we have included the employment rate over the 
total working age population as the dependent variable in our model. 
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 See Chapple 1999 for a survey of pioneering studies. 
8
 Or, alternatively, its inverse, the employment rate.  
The explanatory variables in which we focus our interest are “Active Labor Market Policies” and 
“Pasive Labor Market policies”. Both variables are extracted as a public expenditure share over GDP 
and, similarly to the dependent variable, the main datasource is Eurostat although some observations 
have been retrieved from the OECD (OECD Employment database).  
 
The level of public expenditure in ALMP is usually included expressed as a share of GDP. Although 
alternative specifications have been considered, for example the inclusion of the variable in per capita 
terms over the total unemployed population or as a share of total Labor Market Policies expenditure, 
these specifications have been proved to be problematic due to their correlation with some 
explanatory variables (see Chapple 1999). Expenditure in Passive Labor Market Policies (PLMPs) is 
included as a control variable is most studies as PLMPs have been clearly identified as a strong 
(positive) determinant of unemployment.  
 
Regarding the use of other control variables, the set of variables used in previous panel data studies 
has been extremely heterogeneous as a result of the different hypotheses taken into account. We 
include a set of macroeconomic indicators and a set of institutional indicators, inspired in the analysis 
of related literature and in preliminary estimations.  
 
Our macroeconomic indicators used as explanatory variables are Total Factor Productivity, the Terms 
of Trade, per capita GDP (expressed in logs), Public expenditure (as a share of GDP), compensation of 
employees in the general government (as a share of GDP), and labor productivity. These have been 
retrieved from Eurostat and Ameco databases.  
 
Estevao (2007), for example include, in addition to expenditure on Pasive  Labor Market Policies, the 
logarithm of per capita GDP in the business sector at constant prices, technological growth in the 
business sector , average gross replacement rate (benefits) during the first year of unemployment, 
share of public sector in total employment, economic openness, government current receipts as a 
share of GDP, in addition to institutional variables (union membership as % of employees, index of 
employment protection made by NN (Nickell and Nunziata 2001) from Blanchard and Wolfers 2000, 
tax wedge data including social security contributions and labour income taxes, bargaining 
coordination variable provided by NN and the index of unemployment benefits duration provided by 
NN). Other variables in OECD (1993) are coverage, union coordination, employer coordination, benefit 
duration, replacement ratio and change in inflation.  
 
Regarding estimations which make use of regional-level data, Hujer et al.(2004) include national 
unemployment, national vacancy rate, seasonal dummies (quarterly data). For the estimation in which 
the dependent variable is employment, Hagen (2003) includes in addition, population density and 
variables representing the sectorial distribution of the labor force.  Altavilla and Caroleo (2006) include 
school attendance rate, Gross Fixed investment, GDP per capita and productivity for a panel of 20 
Italian regions. 
 
Inspired by the importance that some studies put in variables capturing institutional settings of the 
labor market, we have also considered some institutional variables taken from the OECD Employment 
database, the employment protection index, the trade union density variable and the average tax 
wedge.  
 
4.2 Regional data 
 
The role of the ESF in the Spanish regional public administrations is analyzed by constructing a 
database of panel data from the 17 Spanish regions for the time period 1989 2010. The dependent 
variable is, again, the employment rate computed as the ratio of employed persons over the total 
working age population. Table [9] describes the variables, its unit of measure and the sources of data, 
while table [10] includes the summary statistics. 
 
Among the set of explanatory variables, there are two variables in which we will focus our attention. 
Firstly, we introduce a measure of fiscal autonomy of the Spanish regional governments captured by 
the variable DEC. This variable is constructed as the ratio of per capita regional to total public 
expenditure9, and represents the degree of fiscal autonomy of each regional government. The source 
of variability in this ratio comes from the fact that Spanish regions have not reached and homogeneous 
level of fiscal autonomy simultaneously, as some of them have gained advanced competencies 
obtained through bilateral bargaining with the central government due to their privileged status in the 
Spanish Constitution. Secondly, the variable ESF represents the current transfers from the European 
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 This is indicator has been widely used in the literature to capture fiscal decentralization. See, for example, Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2006) 
Union to the Spanish regional government under the European Social Fund. This variable is expressed 
as a share over regional GDP. 
 
The variable ESF is included together with another variable capturing total public expenditure by the 
regional government, expressed as a share of GDP. This variable will capture to which extent enlarging 
the regional budget could have an impact on the employment rate of a region. As all fiscal variables, 
the interpretation of the coefficient attached must take into account the impact of the omitted fiscal 
variables on the dependent variable. Alternatively, we consider also another model in which the fiscal 
variable is regional public expenditure on social promotion, that captures public expenditure on active 
labor market policies10, among other issues.  
 
Finally, we use also the log of income per capita, to capture the relative wealth of each region, real 
production growth, in order to capture the business cycle fluctuations and population, expressed in 
miles people, that controls for the effect of the relative size of each region.  
 
 
5. Estimations and results 
 
5.1 Econometric modeling 
 
We estimate the impact of active labor market policies public expenditure on the employment level in 
a set of European countries. For this purpose, we build and estimate a panel data model in which the 
employment rate is the dependent variable and the level of public expenditure on active labor market 
policies is among the set of explanatories:  
 
Employmentit = ρ Employmentit-1 + β1 ALMPit + β2 PLMPit + γ mit + σ nit + μi +λt +εit (1) 
 
Where Employmentit is the unemployment rate in country “i” at time “t”, ALMP and PLMP are the level 
of public expenditure as a share of GDP in active and passive labor market policies respectively. mit is a 
                                                          
10
 Unfortunately, the level of breakdown available does not allow isolating ALMP from other policy areas. Nevertheless, the 
examination of recent databases on public regional budget with better detailed accounting reveals that policies related to 
the labor market represent the majority of this type of expenditure. 
vector of macroeconomic variables affecting the level of unemployment. It includes total factor 
productivity terms of trade, the level of per capita production (in logarithmic form) and, in an extended 
version of the model, also the level of public expenditure as a share of GDP, labor productivity and the 
level of public compensation of employees.  
 
For the estimation of the model with Spanish regional-level data, we use a fiscal variable capturing 
either the EU transfers to regional government under the ESF program or the level of public 
expenditure in social policies, which includes –but not only- the ALMPs undertaken by the regional 
government. The vector mit includes the share over GDP of public expenditure at the regional level, 
economic growth, the level of per capita income, total population and a measure of fiscal 
decentralization (defined as the ratio of regional to total public expenditure in per capita terms). 
 
nit is a vector of institutional variables, only included in the model with country-level data as for the 
Spanish regions institutional settings are common to all units; μi is the country specific term and λt are 
the country dummies. A specification of the model substitutes the country dummies for a unit specific 
linear time-trend.  
 
We have estimated the coefficients using the one-step version of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator instead of the two-step procedure, based on the findings in Judson and Owen (1996) applied 
to the length of the cross-section and time dimensions of our dataset. We also discard the use of the 
system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) as it improves the 
efficiency of the "difference GMM" estimator by introducing additional assumptions of no correlation 
between the fixed-effects and the first differences of the instrumenting variables which we are not 
totally comfortable with. They also develop a one step robust procedure for the cases in which 
heteroskedasticity exists. There is no need to use the robust estimator in this study due to the 
characteristics of the data (furthermore, the gains in precision of the two steps procedure are more 
relevant also in the presence of heteroskedasticity). The Sargan test of over identifying restrictions 
over-rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity with the one step procedure, which will not be a 
drawback in our case since our data are not suspected of heteroskedasticity and in any case the Sargan 
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
The use of this estimator will capture, in addition, two important features related to the variables used 
in this estimation: firstly, it is able to capture the dynamic behaviour of the variables, as our dependent 
variable seems to be strongly time-persistent; and, secondly, the GMM estimate also controls for 
endogeneity of the control by using the lagged values of the levels of the endogenous and the 
predetermined variables as instruments. Some of our control variables and, in particular, the variable 
in which we will focus our attention (ALMP) could be endogenous, as the levels of employment could 
drive the share of the public budget devoted to active labor market policies. Ignoring this reverse 
causality issue might lead to overestimation of the casual relationship in the other direction. It is 
necessary to test for the validity of the instruments as well as the presence of serial correlation in the 
residuals once the equation has been estimated. 
 
The model has been estimated introducing the variables in first differences, with the exception of the 
institutional variables. This is motivated by the suspicion that the dependent variable could be non-
stationary, as revealed by preliminary estimations of the equation in levels and examination of their 
residuals.  
 
Alternatively, we might think that the omission of relevant dynamics in the model is the source of the 
complications observed in the estimation in levels. It seems reasonable to assume that employment in 
a given period may be correlated with past trends in other macroeconomic variables. Parameter 
estimates based on a static estimator are biased and inconsistent if the true model is not static. For 
that reason we propose a panel data model that includes unobserved country specific effects and 
allow for the existence of lagged values of the explanatory variables, in addition to lagged values of the 
dependent variable. We want to allow for the possibility that the variations of past control variables 
may still affect current variations in employment. The specification of this equation to be estimated 
from panel data can be expressed as an ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag) model: 
 
Employmentit = ρr Employmentit-r + β
1 CONTROLit + β
2 CONTROLit-1 + σ nit + μi +λt +εit  (2) 
 
Where CONTROL is a vector of variables including ALMP, PLMP and the variables included in “m”. 
Long-term relationships between the variables may be easily derived from the estimation of this 
equation. Equation (2) is, again, estimated using the one-step Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator, and in the presence of a common time trend or unit specific time trends as alternatives to 
the time dummies λt. 
 
An economy on its steady state is assumed to show a constant employment rate, and therefore 
identical values for the variables over time. Imposing this condition we can work out long-term 
coefficients: 
     
β longterm = (β1 + β2)/ (1 - ρr Employmentit-r)  (3) 
      
Standard errors for coefficients obtained with this procedure may be easily computed using Stata. 
They are computed applying a delta method. A general discussion of this method can be found in 
Wooldridge (2002) 
 
As a robustness check for the regional data, we consider also an alternative model that allows for the 
presence of spatial dependence, as we may suspect that there is some degree of contagion among 
regions with respect to the relationship of employment with fiscal policy. Spatial spillover effects have 
been considered in previous studies analyzing the effect of EU Structural Funds, and its omission could 
lead to biased estimates11.   
 
Firstly, we assume the presence of spatial lagged dependence (i.e. we will include a spatially weighted 
dependent variable), that in our model will imply that employment in region “i” may be influenced also 
by employment in the remaining regions, weighted by the distance of these to region “i”. For this sake, 
we will specify a weighting matrix W that includes information about the distance between regions. 
This matrix will be constructed from the great circle distance between the capital cities of every 
region12.  
 
We modify our original model (1) in order to include the spatial lag component: 
 
Employmentit = W Employmentjt + β CONTROLit + μi +λt +εit (4) 
 
Where the coefficient  represents the indirect effect that changes in the explanatory variables of a 
unit causes in the dependent variable of the other units, in addition to the direct effect caused in its 
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 see, for example, Mohl and Hagen 2010 
12
 as in Dall Erba and Le Gallo (2008). The use of physical distance, instead of infrastructure-based measures, ensures the 
exogeneity of the criteria. Each element (wij) of this matrix, whose diagonal consists of zeros, represents the inverse of the 
distance between two regions (“i” and “j”), normalized so that every row add to one (that is, wij = [1/dij] / j [1/dij]) 
own unit. These are called global indirect effects, as they are propagated to all units even in the case 
when wij is equal to zero (see Elhorst 2012).  
 
Secondly, we also report the estimates of the Spatial Durbin model, which also allows for the presence 
of spatial dependence in some or all explanatory variables capturing indirect spillover effects:   
 
Employmentit = W Employmentjt + β1 CONTROLit + β2W CONTROLjt + μi +λt +εit  (5) 
 
 
The coefficient 2 introduces the so-called local indirect effect. This implies that changes in the control 
variables in the neighboring regions may affect a region´s employment rate. In contrast to the global 
effect, the local effect is only propagated to a unit´s neighborhood set according to the weights 
included in the matrix W. Equation (5) can be rewritten in order to report one indirect effect 
associated to each control variable:  
 
Employmentit = (I - W)
-1 (β1 CONTROLit + β2W CONTROLjt) + μi +λt + (I - W)
-1 εit         (6) 
 
 
5.2 Results 
 
Table [3] show the result of estimating equation (1) using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator. The model has been estimated in first differences, with the exception of the institutional 
variables that are highly time-persistent and are expressed in levels.  
 
The estimates assume three alternative models, with respect to the control variables included. Firstly, 
we introduce only the variables that are common to most literature examined; secondly, we consider 
also other macroeconomic variables that could drive employment rates, such as public expenditure, 
compensation of employees or labor productivity; and finally, we introduce also institutional variables 
governing the labor market, such as the employment protection index, trade union density and the tax 
wedge. Columns [5] and [6] assume, in addition, the presence of time dummies, while columns [7] and 
[8] introduce, instead, country-specific linear time trend. 
 
As we can see from table [3], the increase in the unemployment rate is still strongly time persistent, as 
it seems to be driven by its own value in the previous period with a coefficient around 0.3. As for the 
variables in which we focus our interest, active and passive labor market policies (expressed in first-
differences over their share on GDP value) while the impact of passive labor market policies seems to 
be extremely influential on the final employment rate, the role of the active labor market policy is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient estimated suggests that a one percent increase (over GDP) of 
public expenditure in passive labor market policies could induce a 2 percentage point decrease in the 
employment rate.   
 
At this stage, it is important to mention two important points in order to interpret fiscal variables. The 
first point refers to the findings of several studies on the growth effect of fiscal variables13 that showed 
that the interpretation of the coefficients associated to fiscal variables must take into account the 
implicit budgetary assumptions. The government budget constraint implies that the estimated 
coefficient of each fiscal element within a regression will depend on how it is financed. The omission of 
elements of the budget of the government introduces implicit assumptions about the financing of the 
variables included. In our estimation, for example, the coefficient associated to the variable public 
expenditure estimates the impact on employment of an increase in public expenditure financed by the 
omitted fiscal variables (tax revenues or budgetary deficit). Therefore, the final effect on employment 
depends of both, on the isolated impact of the included variable –Public Expenditure-, and on the 
impact of the omitted variables (public revenues and budgetary deficit).  
 
The second point, and also in line with the growth literature14, refers to the fact that the final impact of 
an increase of a fiscal variable depends of its current level. Increasing a type of public expenditure may 
have a positive impact on economic growth or employment up to a certain level, at which probably 
additional increases seem to have an insignificant impact. If the level of public expenditure in that 
category increased far above this threshold, its relationship with employment and growth might 
become negative. Therefore, when we estimate an insignificant coefficient associated to a fiscal 
variable this could reflect the fact that the level of this variable is currently near its optimum.  
 
While total factor productivity improvements seem to foster the employment rate, labor productivity 
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 See Kneller et al. (1999) 
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 See Afonso and González-Alegre (2011) 
growth lowers employment rate. Both results, although contradictory, are also intuitive15. Larger 
multifactor productivity foment more activity and, therefore, demands further labor supply while, 
simultaneously, higher labor productivity diminishes the amount of labor necessary to sustain the level 
of production. The contribution of the other control variables is more controversial, as the level of 
significance of the coefficients estimated are quite poor. Regarding the institutional variables, although 
many other studies have underlined their contribution to the level of equilibrium employment16  in the 
labor market, in this estimation their impact may be partially absorbed by the unit-specific term as 
they are highly time persistent (at least according to the time frequency considered in this paper).   
 
The contribution of the time dummies or the country specific time trends to improve the estimation 
seems marginal according to the estimates shown in this table. 
 
Tables [4] and [5] show the results obtained while running identical estimations, but after splitting the 
sample in two subsamples of similar size according to the level of ESF transfers obtained by every 
country. Table [4] presents results for the 18 countries that receive larger transfers from the ESF in per 
capita terms17, while table [5] presents similar results for the 10 remaining countries of our dataset18. 
The comparison of both tables yield an interesting result: while public expenditure on ALMP seems to 
be a significant determinant of Employment level in highly ESF subsidized countries, its significance 
gets poorer for the set of countries whose level of per capita transfers are lower. That might reflect the 
fact that ESF is precisely focused on these countries in which the level of public expenditure on ALMPs 
is beyond its optimal level.  
 
Tables [6] to [8], show the long term coefficients estimated through equation (3), from the coefficients 
obtained in the estimation of equation (2) using the same GMM Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator  
and including the variables in levels. The absolute values of the coefficients, therefore, are not 
comparable to with those on tables [3] to [5], which are obtained with variables in first-differences. 
However, regarding the sign and significance levels of the estimated coefficients, results are not 
contradictory with those obtained from equation (1). In fact, the distance between the coefficients 
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 See, for example, Nunziata (2002) 
17
 These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary,  Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovenia and Slovakia, although some units are dropped for estimating longer versions of 
the model due to poor data availability.  
18
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
associate to ALMPs and other fiscal variables becomes more evident. The coefficient associated to the 
variable ALMP is positively significant only for those countries perceiving higher relative transfers 
through the ESF. As for the other control variables, we observe stronger levels of significance in the 
coefficients associated to the income per capita variable and no other remarkable differences.  
 
Regional data 
 
Table [11] display the results of estimating equation (1) using our panel of Spanish regional data. We 
contemplate two alternative sets of fiscal variables, either EU current transfers to Spanish regional 
governments through the ESF and the level of total regional public expenditure or the level of regional 
public expenditure in social policies, which includes expenditure in ALMPs. The selection of the two 
alternatives is mainly motivated that public expenditure in social policies is highly correlated with the 
other two fiscal variables by definition. Variables are expressed in first differences. The results shown 
in this table suggest that increasing public expenditure might have a negative impact on employment. 
This may reflect the fact that additional expenditure could lower the propensity of the working age 
population to search and find a job, but it also internalizes the indirect effect that the increase of 
public revenues –necessary to finance the raise in expenditure- may also have on the employment 
rate.  
 
However, when we point to social expenditure or, more precisely, to expenditure on ESF financed 
projects, the negative coefficient disappears. This means that public expenditure in ALMP at the 
regional level is more beneficial –or less harmful- to the employment rate than the public expenditure 
considered as a whole.  
 
We also introduce a variable capturing the level of fiscal autonomy of each region (DEC). The 
coefficients associated to that variable are always positive and, very often, highly statistically 
significant. This reinforces the hypothesis that regions with larger levels of fiscal autonomy are more 
capable to embark in policies that fit better the idiosyncratic characteristics of the regional labor 
market, fostering employment levels. When we interact this variable with the ESF transfers, the 
estimated coefficients are, however, statistically insignificant.  
 
The sign associated to other control variables, maybe with the exception of population, seem fairly 
reasonable. The expansionary phase of the cycle and larger per capita income are associated with 
higher employment. The relationship with population is not counterintuitive but is in line with the fact 
that immigration flows may foster dynamics beneficial for the labor market.  
 
Table [12] show the long term coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation (2), including the 
variable in levels. Basically, all results are robust to this change of specification and the significance 
levels are stronger in comparison to the previous table.   
 
The fixed-effect estimates of the coefficients in the spatial lag model described by equation (4) are 
included in table [13]. In this model, the level of employment in a region affects employment in other 
regions, and the importance of this relationship is assumed to depend on the physical distance 
between them.  
 
According to the results described in the table, spatial dependence could play an important role. 
Nevertheless, the main results observed in previous estimations remain stable, although there are 
some variations in the significance level of some coefficients.  Differences are not dramatic, except for 
the coefficient accompanying the growth variable which could be largely correlated with the spatial 
lagged variable. Regarding the variable that captures the level of fiscal autonomy, the presence of time 
trends fades away its significance level, although in the absence of a trend, even including time 
dummies, it is still a strong determinant of the employment level.  
 
Table [14] shows the results assuming spatial dependence in the explanatory variables. The reported 
LM test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the error term, rejects the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in all cases, as expected from the transformation from equation (5) to (6). 
Irrespectively of all the assumptions implicit in this formulation of the model, the results in which we 
focus our interest remain relatively stable. The impact of fiscal decentralization on employment and 
the relative force of the regional fiscal variables considered, ESF transfers, total expenditure and social 
expenditure, persist solid to the presence of spillover effects. The levels of significance of these 
spillover effects, in addition, seem to reveal that these should not be ignored when using regional-level 
data in this framework.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In a environment of a rising unemployment rate emerging as a consequence and probably also as a 
determinant of a difficult economic conjuncture, the European Union is searching for economic recipes 
that accelerate the exit of the crisis minimizing the short-term impact on unemployment, which is 
already far above the socially acceptable level. One of the strategies recently decided in the European 
Council, has been the provision of an additional fiscal stimulus to Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) 
in order to tackle the high level of youth unemployment. At this point, Economics must be able to 
assess the impact that the several fiscal policies had on unemployment in the past, in order to provide 
the policy maker with useful information in order to design the necessary reforms.  
This paper, tries to asses to which extent ALMPs were successful in the past at raising the employment 
rate in 28 European countries. With that purpose, we build and estimate a panel data model that 
captures the impact of public expenditure on ALMPs, apart from other fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables, in the employment rate measured as the share of employed working aged population. The 
model is estimated by GMM, assuming the possible presence on endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables and non-stationary behaviour of the variables. The sample has been split in order to estimate 
separately the coefficients in those countries in which the relative level of the European Social Fund 
(ESF) subsidy to ALMP is larger. Finally, an alternative model assumes stationarity of the variables but a 
highly dynamic -autoregressive distributed lag- model. 
Two main results are obtained: firstly, the impact of increasing ALMPs public expenditure on 
employment –inclusive of the indirect effect through the necessary increase in public revenues to 
finance the higher expenditure- may be larger than the impact of public expenditure as a whole, 
although the current level of ALMP seem to be near its optimum threshold; and secondly, public 
expenditure in ALMPs seems to be significantly more beneficial in those countries in which the ESF is 
largely present. 
 
In addition, this paper wants also to explore to which extent the impact of the ALPMs and the ESF 
could be conditioned by the –heterogeneous- levels of fiscal decentralization observed present among 
European countries. Spain has experienced a process of fiscal decentralization in the recent years and, 
simultaneously, has been recipient of an important share of the Structural Actions. Due to the 
heterogeneous level of economic development and also to the diverse political status of Spanish 
regions, both policies have affected them in an asymmetric way. These conditions make Spanish 
regions the perfect benchmark in order to analyze the role of fiscal decentralization on the 
mechanisms driving the Structural Actions.  
 
Using panel data from the seventeen Spanish regions for the period 1989-2010, we estimate the 
impact  of the ESF and related fiscal variables on it employment rate. We include among the 
explanatory variable, an indicator of the level of fiscal autonomy gained by each region at every time. 
The results previously described about the impact of ALMPs on employment are confirmed with our 
estimation from regional data. In addition, higher level of fiscal autonomy at the regional level seem to 
be correlated with larger rates of employment, which could reinforce the traditional hypothesis of 
fiscal federalism about the larger utility of public expenditure as the level of the administration gets 
closer to the citizen. We also explore the robustness of these results to the presence of spatial effects 
among regions by estimating an equivalent spatial lag model.  
 
Probably, stronger robustness checks must be done in order to confirm these results. The use of 
alternative models, with larger variety of control variables and alternative estimation methodologies 
could shed some more light on this issue. If these conclusions are confirmed by subsequent research, 
other institutional features of economies, such as their level of fiscal decentralization or the presence 
of intergovernmental grants, should be taken into account in addition to the labour market variables 
that are driving recent research developments in this field. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References:  
 
Afonso, A. and González-Alegre, J. (2011), “Economic Growth and Budgetary Components: a Panel 
Assessment for the EU", Empirical Economics 41(3), 703-723 
 
Altavilla, C. and Caroleo, F.E. (2006), “Evaluating the dynamic effects of active labor policies in Italy”, 
LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(2), 349-382 
 
Altavilla, C. and Caroleo, F.E. (2011), “Asymmetric effects of national-based active labour market 
policies”, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (University of Naples) Working paper no 293 
 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991), "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations", Review of Economic Studies, 58, 227-297 
 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995), "Another look at the instrumental variables estimation of error-
component models", Journal of Econometrics, 68 
 
Baccaro, L. and Rei, D. (2005), “Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD countries: A 
Times-Series Cross-Section Analysis (1960-1998)”, International Institute for Labor Studies- Geneva 
Discussion paper, no. 160 
 
Bache, I., George, S. and Bulmer, S. (2011), Politics in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Basanini, A. (2008), “The impact of Labour Market Policies on productivity in OECD countries”, 
International Productivity Monitor, Centre for the Study of Living Standards, vol. 17, 3- 15 
 
Basanini, A. and Duval, R. (2009), “Unemployment institutions, and reform complementarities: re-
assessing the aggregate evidence for OECD countries”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 25(1), 
40-59 
 
Blanchard, O. and Wolfers, J. (2000), “The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment: The aggregate evidence”, Economic Journal, 110 (462), 1-33 
 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998), "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models", Journal of Econometrics 87 
 
Boeri, T. and Burda, M.C. (1996), “Active labor market policies, job matching and the Czech miracle”, 
European Economic Review 40, 805-817 
 
Boone, J. and Van Ours, J.C. (2009), “Bringing unemployment back to work: Effective active labor 
market policies”, De Economist 157(3), 293-313 
 
Calmfors, L., Forslund, A. and Hemstrom, M. (2002), “Does active labour market policy work? Lessons 
from the Swedish experiences”, CESifo Working paper no. 675 
 
Calmfors, L. and Skedinger, P. (1995), “Does active labour market policy increase employment? 
Theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence from Sweden,” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, vol. 11(1), 91-109 
 
Chapple, S. (1999), “Displacement effects of active labour market policy”, Report for the Department 
of Labour, NZ Institute of Economic Research 
 
Dall´erba, S, Le Gallo, J (2008) Regional convergence and the impact of European Structural Funds over 
1989-1999: A spatial econometric analysis. Papers in Regional Science 87(2), 219-244 
 
Domínguez González, A (1989), “El Fondo Social Europeo y España”, Economía y Sociología del Trabajo, 
no. 4-5, 59-72. 
 
Elhorst, JP (2012) Dynamic spatial panels: models, methods and inferences. Journal of Geographical 
Systems 14(1):5-28 
 
Elmeskov, J., Martin, J.P. and Scarpetta, S. (1998), “Key lessons for labour market reforms: evidence 
from OECD countries´ experiences”, Swedish Economic Policy Review no. 5, 205-252 
 
Estevao, M. (2007), “Labor policies to raise employment”, IMF Staff papers vol. 54 (1), 113-138 
 
European Communities (1998); The European Social Fund. An overview of the programming period 
1994-1999, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (OPOCE) ISBN 
92-828-1136-0 
 
European Commission (2007); European Social Fund: 50 years investing in people, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities ISBN 92-79-03357-3 
 
European Communities (2009); EU Budget 2008. Financial Report, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities ISBN 978-92-79-12018-3 
 
European Commission (2007b); Cohesion policy 2007-13- Commentaries and official texts, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities ISBN 92-79-03805-2 
 
European Commission (2007c), “18th Annual report on the implementation of the Structural Funds 
2006”, Commission Staff Working Document COM(2007) 676 final 
 
European Commission (2013); Promoting jobs, inclusion and social policy as an investment, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities ISBN 978-92-79-24020-1 
 
Forslund, A. and Krueger, A. (1997), “An evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: News 
and received wisdom”, NBER Chapters in: The Welfare State in transition: Reforming the Swedish 
Model, Cambridge, MA: NBER 
 
González-Alegre, J. (2010), “Descentralización Fiscal y Transferencias Intergubernamentales: La Política 
Regional Europea y las Comunidades Autónomas. ” in, Bosch, N. and Solé-Ollé. A. (eds), Informe sobre 
Federalismo Fiscal en España (ISBN 978-84-613-9114-1), Barcelona: IEB 
 
González-Alegre, J. (2010b), “Decentralization and the Composition of Public Expenditure. Evidence 
from Spain”, Regional Studies, vol. 44 (8) 
 
Hagen, T. (2003), “Three approaches to the evaluation of Active Labour market policy in East Germany 
using regional data”, ZEW (Centre for European Economic Research) discussion paper no. 03-27 
 
Hujer,R., Blien, U., Caliendo, M. and Zeiss, C. (2002), “Macroeconomic evaluation of Active Labour 
Market Policies in Germany. A dynamic approach using regional data”, IZA Discussion paper no. 616 
 
Hujer, R. and Caliendo, M. (2000), “Evaluation of active labour market policy: methodological concepts 
and empirical estimates”, IZA (Institute for the Study of Labor)  Discussion paper no. 236 
 
Hujer, R. and Zeiss, C. (2003), “Macroeconomic impacts of ALMP on the matching process in West 
Germany”, IZA Discussion paper no. 915  
 
Hujer,R., Caliendo, M. and Zeiss, C. (2004), “Macroeconomic evaluation of active labour market policy. 
A case study for Germany”, in Descy, P. and Tessaring, M. (eds), Impact of education and training. Third 
report on vocational training research in Europe, OPOCE: Luxembourg 
 
Jackman, R., Pissarides, C. and Savouri, S. (1990), “Labour market policies and unemployment in the 
OECD”, CEP (Centre for Economic Performance, LSE) Discussion paper no. 11 
 
Judson, R.A. and Owen, A.L. (1996), "Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Practical Guide for 
Macroeconomists", Federal Reserve Board of Governors, mimeo 
 
Kneller, R., Bleaney, M.F. and Gemmell. (1999), "Fiscal policy and growth: evidence from OECD 
countries", Journal of Public Economics 74, 171-190 
 
Layard, R., Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. (1991), Unemployment: Macroeconomic performance and the 
labor market. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Lundin, M. and Skedinger, P. (2006), “Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of 
Swedish local employment service committees”, Journal of Public Economics, 90(4-5), 775-798 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J, McNab R (2006), “Fiscal decentralization, macrostability and growth”, Hacienda 
Pública Española, 179, 25-49 
 
Mohl, P and Hagen, T (2010) Do EU structural funds promote regional growth? New evidence from 
various panel data approaches. Regional Science and Urban Economics 40: 353-365 
 
Molero, J.C (2002), “Gasto Público y Federalismo Fiscal en España. Periodo 1984-1998” MPRA Paper 
No. 8098 
 
Nickell, S. and Layard, R. (1999), “Labor market institutions and economic performance”, Handbook of 
Labor Economics, vol. 3(part c), 3029-3084 
 
Nickell, S. and Nunziata, L. (2001), “Labour Market Institutions Database”, London School of Public 
Economics. 
 
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L. and Ochel, W. (2005), “Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do 
we know?”, The Economic Journal no. 115 (1), 1-27 
 
Nunziata, L. (2002), “Unemployment, Labour Market Institutions and Shocks” Nuffield College, 
University of Oxford Economics Papers, no. 2002-W16 
 
OECD (1993), Economic Outlook, July, Paris: OECD 
 
Sachs, A. (2012), “What really drives unemployment? A Bayesian approach to determine the impact of 
institutions on the unemployment rate”, Economic Bulletin vol 32 (1), 1008-1019 
 
Scarpetta, S. (1996), “Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings of 
unemployment: A cross-country study”, OECD Economic Studies no. 26, 43-98 
 
Woolridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
press 
 
Zetterberg, J. (1995), “Unemployment, Labour Market Policy and the Wage Bargaining System”, FIEF 
reprint series no. 99 (Trade Union Institute for Economic Research) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table [1]: Country-level data. Variable definition and sources 
Label Variable Definition Units Source 
emprate  
Employment 
rate 
Ratio of the employed over working age 
population 
Percentage 
over aged 16-
64 population 
Eurostat / OECD 
(Annual Labor Force 
Statistics) 
ALMP 
Active labour 
market policies 
Public expenditure in active labor measures 
excluding "Labor market services" (categories 2-7) 
share of GDP 
Eurostat / OECD 
(Employment 
database) 
PLMP 
Pasive labour 
market policies 
Public expenditure in pasive labor measures: out 
of work income manteinance and support and 
early retirement (categories 8-9) 
share of GDP 
Eurostat / OECD 
(Employment 
database) 
tfp 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
The changes in output per unit of combined 
inputs for the total economy  
index 
(2005=100) 
AMECO 
tot Terms of Trade 
The ratio of the change of export prices of goods 
and services to the change of import prices of 
goods and services 
index 
(2005=100) 
AMECO 
lodgdppc 
Logarithm of per 
capita GDP 
Natural logarithm of gross domestic product at 
market prices divided by the average number of 
inhabitants for one year 
logarithm of 
GDPpc 
expressed in 
Euro 
EUROSTAT 
pexp 
Public 
Expenditure 
(general 
government) 
Total expenditure of the general government (ESA 
1995) 
share of GDP AMECO 
compempl 
Compensation 
of employees 
public 
expenditure  
Compensation of employeesof the general 
government (ESA 1995) 
share of GDP  AMECO 
labprod 
Labor 
productivity 
Real labour productivity per person employed 
index 
(2005=100) 
EUROSTA 
emprotectio
n 
Employment 
protection index 
Strictness of employment protection legislation: 
overall (Version 1 of the overall indicator is the 
unweighted average of sub-indicators for regular 
employment and temporary employment. 
index 
OECD (Employment 
database) 
tradeundens 
Trade union 
density 
The ratio of  wage and salary earners that are 
trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour 
Force Statistics). Density is calculated using survey 
data, wherever possible, and administrative data 
adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members  otherwise. 
percentage 
over total 
number of 
workers 
OECD (Employment 
database) 
taxwedge tax wedge 
Average tax wedge, Single person at 100% of 
average earnings, no child 
percentage 
over personal 
income 
OECD (Employment 
database) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table [2]: Country-level data. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
emprate  646 63.94 7.47 45.37 81.53 
ALMP 546 0.564 0.445 0.021 2.525 
PLMP 553 1.269 0.994 0.080 5.446 
tfp 661 92.35 9.72 57.18 115.88 
tot 694 98.35 8.23 60.06 128.49 
lodgdppc 684 9.49 0.93 5.99 11.33 
pexp 636 46.10 7.15 24.33 78.09 
compempl 655 11.40 2.55 2.86 19.35 
labprod 658 89.69 15.44 42.20 132.20 
emprotection 570 2.34 0.84 0.60 4.19 
tradeundens 577 37.91 20.11 7.05 83.89 
taxwedge 552 42.32 7.00 22.23 56.89 
Table [3]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. First differences.  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
emprate         
empratet-1 0.3922*** 0.3599*** 0.3515*** 0.3061*** 0.3187*** 0.2717*** 0.2874*** 0.2203*** 
 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.042 
ALMP 0.4730 0.5606 0.4175 0.6419 0.2790 0.4225 0.3357 0.5626 
 0.430 0.449 0.423 0.441 0.427 0.462 0.429 0.445 
PLMP -2.3255*** -2.0681*** -2.3725*** -2.1083*** -2.1652*** -1.9432*** -2.4505*** -2.1171*** 
 0.199 0.213 0.202 0.212 0.219 0.225 0.212 0.219 
tfp 0.1577*** 0.4030*** 0.1273*** 0.3589*** 0.1125*** 0.3397*** 0.1149*** 0.3363*** 
 0.023 0.046 0.027 0.049 0.034 0.051 0.028 0.050 
tot 0.0041 0.006313 0.0036 -0.0057919 0.0023791 -0.0073242 -0.007024 -0.0231818 
 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.019 
lodgdppc 0.1278 0.1995388 -0.0557 -0.0578 0.0766342 0.2551985 0.6924023 1.9676*** 
 0.145 0.150 0.243 0.271 0.398 0.413 0.676 0.698 
pexp  0.0057582  -0.0124  -0.0038698  -0.0046065 
  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.027 
compempl  -0.0264145  -0.0664  -0.0206113  -0.1657695 
  0.123  0.135  0.133  0.143 
labprod  -0.2483***  -0.2660***  -0.2602***  -0.2724*** 
  0.037  0.038  0.039  0.038 
emprotection  -1.78704 0.0874 0.1830 0.1681147 0.1215115 -0.1095752 -0.0468167 
   0.152 0.161 0.171 0.177 0.271 0.292 
tradeundens   -0.0245 -0.0232 -0.0156227 -0.0213882 -0.0556** -0.0318178 
   0.017 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.027 0.028 
taxwedge   0.0081 -0.0054 0.0030639 -0.0056669 0.0254757 0.0125423 
   0.018 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.033 0.034 
Sargan test 
[1]
 444.01 (.55) 417.8 (.54) 397.5 (.62) 369.9 (.70) 395.5 (.29) 355.7 (.46) 375.6 (.62) 340.5 (.73) 
         
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -4.05 (.00) -4.12 (.00) -3.79 (.00) -3.84 (.00) -4.09 (.00) -3.86 (.00) -3.79 (.00) -3.84 (.00) 
 -0.98 (.32) 0.06 (.94) -1.23 (.21) 0.49 (.62) -0.73 (.46) 1.58 (.11) -1.47 (.14) 0.22 (.82) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 455 (28) 431 (28) 415 (21) 391 (21) 415 (21) 391 (21) 415 (21) 391 (21) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
Table [4]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate in countries with large ESF subsidies. First differences.  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
emprateFD          
empratet-1 0.4457*** 0.4307*** 0.3971*** 0.3765*** 0.3998*** 0.3930*** 0.3641*** 0.3138*** 
 0.043 0.043 0.050 0.049 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.054 
ALMP 1.8871** 1.6542** 1.9872** 1.8968*** 1.7753** 1.055506 1.9241** 1.8806** 
 0.749 0.706 0.770 0.717 0.791 0.773 0.806 0.744 
PLMP -2.4981*** -2.0125*** -2.5596*** -2.0297*** -2.3050*** -1.7397*** -2.5990*** -2.0618*** 
 0.263 0.276 0.276 0.281 0.315 0.319 0.294 0.297 
tfp 0.1943*** 0.5544*** 0.1741*** 0.5317*** 0.1251*** 0.4992*** 0.1642*** 0.5217*** 
 0.028 0.061 0.037 0.068 0.042 0.075 0.039 0.070 
tot -0.0094784 0.0157556 -0.0139281 -0.0018746 0.0388564 0.0326631 -0.0287 -0.0268848 
 0.032 0.030 0.037 0.033 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.035 
lodgdppc 0.280781 0.5316*** -0.1143752 -0.052415 0.145806 0.209969 0.573136 2.0107** 
 0.197 0.196 0.384 0.452 0.672 0.693 1.043 1.005 
pexp  -0.0010274  -0.0138486  0.0023083  0.0025584 
  0.031  0.032  0.032  0.034 
compempl  -0.0517737  -0.1397042  -0.0769805  -0.2307115 
  0.143  0.163  0.170  0.178 
labprod  -0.358231  -0.3932***  -0.4022***  -0.4023*** 
  0.052  0.054  0.063  0.056 
emprotection   -0.1382265 0.0402784 0.0853494 0.0300336 -0.1364801 -0.0883354 
   0.236 0.218 0.256 0.245 0.444 0.454 
tradeundens   -0.0234632 -0.0314611 0.0078047 -0.0118426 -0.0204332 -0.0172985 
   0.027 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.038 
taxwedge   -0.0276604 -0.0288301 -0.0173494 -0.0238255 0.0028631 0.0209398 
   0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.058 0.052 
Sargan test 
[1]
 224.5 (.64) 215.4 (.55) 174.5 (.78) 153.8 (.88) 158.6 (.62) 135.6 (.81) 161.2 (.82) 139.1 (.92) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -3.00 (.00) -2.98 (.00) -2.67 (.00) -2.69 (.00) -2.96 (.00) -2.57 (.01) -2.66 (.00) -2.71 (.00) 
 -0.72 (.47) 0.52 (.60) -1.01 (.30) 1.20 (.22) -0.26 (.79) 1.63 (.10) -1.08 (.27) 1.15 (.24) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 239 (18) 228 (18) 199 (11) 188 (11) 199 (11) 188 (11) 199 (11) 188 (11) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
 
Table [5]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate in countries with low ESF subsidies. First differences.  
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
emprate         
empratet-1 0.2319*** 0.1249** 0.2060*** 0.1051* 0.1530** 0.0482703 0.1238** 0.0121304 
 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.060 0.064 0.066 0.061 0.063 
ALMP -0.4712 -0.3327 -0.6361 -0.4965 -0.8466 -0.6336 -0.7171 -0.4586 
 0.484 0.519 0.485 0.523 0.530 0.589 0.482 0.513 
PLMP -2.5130*** -2.4347*** -2.4990*** -2.4308*** -2.1381*** -2.0048*** -2.5178*** -2.4261*** 
 0.325 0.349 0.329 0.350 0.410 0.427 0.332 0.351 
tfp 0.0137148 0.0990166 0.0112449 0.0996134 0.058114 0.1421* 0.0124627 0.0737191 
 0.043 0.070 0.043 0.071 0.064 0.081 0.044 0.071 
tot 0.0002499 -0.0199206 0.0020403 -0.014746 0.00058 -0.0060628 -0.0071127 -0.0274125 
 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.025 
lodgdppc -0.1969246 -0.3619173 -0.0413022 -0.2673033 0.3082247 -0.2646921 1.426378 2.4363** 
 0.216 0.223 0.324 0.331 0.794 0.814 1.015 1.069 
pexp  -0.0564503  -0.0497077  -0.0315383  -0.0558091 
  0.046  0.046  0.049  0.045 
compempl  0.0473638  0.0828205  0.2362908  0.0813374 
  0.251  0.251  0.258  0.250 
labprod  -0.1523***  -0.1482***  -0.1326***  -0.1514*** 
  0.049  0.049  0.051  0.049 
emprotection   0.1353407 -0.0035756 0.2141394 0.101064 -0.005023 -0.2232259 
   0.219 0.248 0.252 0.269 0.344 0.365 
tradeundens   -0.0130817 -0.0058664 -0.0150217 -0.0054453 -0.0932** -0.05467 
   0.022 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.042 0.048 
taxwedge   0.0570** 0.0508** 0.0432* 0.0421* 0.0495169 0.0228998 
   0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.041 0.045 
Sargan test 
[1]
 212.9 (.43) 199.4 (.37) 209.6 (.43) 197.3 (.36) 198.3 (.19) 184.0 (.16) 204 (.34) 191.0 (.28) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -2.82 (.00) -2.81 (.00) -2.04 (.00) -2.81 (.00) -2.79 (.00) -2.83 (.00) -2.78 (.00) -2.62 (.00) 
 -0.55 (.58) -0.20 (.84) -0.53 (.59) -0.26 (.79) -0.30 (.76) -0.02 (.98) -0.75 (.45) -0.45 (.65) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 216 (10) 203 (10) 216 (10) 203 (10) 216 (10) 203 (10) 216 (10) 203 (10) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
 Table [6]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. Long-term coefficients 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
ALMP 359.0299 274.2623* 232.9882 315.6508* 277.1125 373.6782** 104.0434 120.3647 
 226.472 162.256 201.293 165.349 178.877 172.643 109.289 112.843 
PLMP -426.6813*** -115.871 -419.822*** -71.5115 -297.9516*** -88.9202 -386.7922*** -220.3541*** 
 99.130 73.575 98.176 78.765 85.103 77.290 56.992 58.209 
tfp 0.098635 0.069555 -0.12958 -0.22102 -0.2089* -0.2604* 0.2360** 0.2679** 
 0.138 0.116 0.127 0.145 0.116 0.144 0.097 0.129 
tot -0.02262 -0.07605 -0.1276* -0.16454*** -0.1329** -0.16675*** 0.025485 -0.00000174 
 0.080 0.056 0.077 0.057 0.066 0.056 0.060 0.062 
lodgdppc 2.528855 6.81402** 7.9901** 8.94615*** 9.6639*** 8.2647** -3.31856 4.395391 
 3.167 3.127 3.236 3.321 3.625 3.934 3.552 3.357 
pexp  -0.4327***  -0.62104***  -0.5292***  -0.2097** 
  0.150  0.160  0.170  0.097 
compempl  -0.29139  -0.28886  -0.3351817  -0.1287263 
  0.476  0.498  0.522  0.334 
labprod  -0.11006  -0.01832  -0.0178859  -0.24113** 
  0.111  0.125  0.123  0.095 
emprotection   1.382357 1.482674 2.2841* 1.9198* 2.3762*** 1.241012 
   1.241 0.990 1.268 1.105 0.863 0.869 
tradeundens   -0.03923 -0.01792 0.059564 0.0079275 -0.1433* -0.0521647 
   0.149 0.113 0.133 0.112 0.087 0.084 
taxwedge   0.110841 -0.14808 -0.06999 -0.2246* -0.114 -0.1347469 
   0.170 0.131 0.148 0.130 0.104 0.100 
Sargan test 
[1]
 443.2 (.34) 436.8 (.13) 410.2 (.25) 368.1 (.41) 390.5 (.21) 345.5 (.39) 403.2 (.12) 358.0 (.26) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -4.00 (.00) -4.12 (.00) -3.68 (.00) -3.86 (.00) -3.92 (.00) -3.82 (.00) -3.65 (.00) -3.62 (.00) 
 -1.10 (.26) -0.35 (.72) -1.19 (.23) 1.16 (.86) -0.95 (.34) 1.00 (.31) -1.21 (.22) 0.58 (.55) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 447 (28) 423 (28) 408 (21) 384 (21) 408 (21) 384 (21) 408 (21) 384 (21) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
 Table [7]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate in countries with large ESF subsidies. Long-term coefficients  
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
ALMP 1292.092** 748.342* 832.67** 552.3928 769.98** 699.61** 514.399* 437.555* 
 513.603 393.364 416.796 383.476 328.579 315.743 279.616 256.112 
PLMP -771.83*** -431.2381*** -583.321*** -182.255 -442.64*** -265.567* -472.098*** -262.61** 
 156.762 139.963 142.450 152.798 114.470 126.157 121.570 117.499 
tfp 0.280414 0.45385** -0.14759 0.183997 -0.19476 0.25014 0.3064* 0.7330*** 
 0.175 0.181 0.148 0.212 0.130 0.188 0.182 0.275 
tot 0.245007* 0.35130** -0.05911 0.079962 0.012762 0.187134 -0.05315 0.045912 
 0.143 0.141 0.133 0.134 0.138 0.147 0.149 0.134 
lodgdppc -1.13833 9.0262** 8.5001** 16.2665*** 10.607** 11.438** -9.17578 2.810274 
 3.712 4.226 3.659 4.458 4.733 5.627 7.252 6.150 
pexp  -0.11075  -0.29986  -0.33908*  -0.12608 
  0.203  0.209  0.204  0.173 
compempl  -0.91259  -0.33759  0.446278  0.017166 
  0.689  0.679  0.630  0.511 
labprod  -0.34909***  -0.41736**  -0.42435***  -0.6371*** 
  0.160  0.178  0.153  0.207 
emprotection   -0.7133 1.38575 0.592321 1.988771 3.5610** 2.7712** 
   1.329 1.307 1.213 1.251 1.639 1.591 
tradeundens   0.191571 0.140245 0.42519*** 0.2857* -0.0226 0.042593 
   0.148 0.178 0.140 0.153 0.140 0.132 
taxwedge   -0.23245 -0.3589* -0.40748*** -0.3881** -0.34656 -0.20992 
   0.198 0.192 0.159 0.155 0.225 0.194 
Sargan test 
[1]
 246.0 (.11) 225.3 (.14) 184.0 (.38) 152.8 (.68) 153.0 (.53) 130.2 (.66) 173.5 (.36) 147.7 (.55) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -2.97 (.00) -2.80 (.00) -2.59 (.00) -2.69 (.00) -3.02 (.00) -2.69 (.00) -2.56 (.01) -2.69 (.00) 
 -1.32 (.18) -0.43 (.66) -1.36 (.17) 0.83 (.40) -1.08 (.27) 1.13 (.16) -1.33 (.18) 1.24 (.21) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 216 (10) 222 (18) 194 (11) 183 (11) 194 (11) 183 (11) 194 (11) 183 (11) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 Table [8]: Country-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate in countries with low ESF subsidies. Long-term coefficients  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
ALMP -73.47021 117.0672 -49.81319 117.0866 41.54324 115.8094 -93.64506 -11.19823 
 228.768 122.909 218.121 143.521 201.341 142.584 83.944 75.170 
PLMP -137.2884 27.89422 -293.0561** 23.11082 -130.5297 61.44377 -255.840*** -151.8046*** 
 126.570 72.467 129.802 88.613 118.952 86.941 50.338 44.152 
tfp -0.1408655 -0.30904** -0.012595 -0.31603* -0.0924542 -0.3361** 0.1716* 0.0455514 
 0.200 0.147 0.201 0.165 0.199 0.158 0.091 0.100 
tot -0.1446917 -0.2432*** -0.1389512 -0.2444*** -0.18510** -0.2139*** -0.0332846 -0.12648*** 
 0.093 0.051 0.093 0.053 0.091 0.051 0.050 0.048 
lodgdppc 7.27625 9.4438*** 6.64881 9.3732** 15.2518* 4.155822 5.5038* 6.3165** 
 5.028 3.243 4.923 3.652 8.358 5.037 3.241 2.962 
pexp  -0.6572***  -0.65303***  -0.5581***  -0.33379*** 
  0.158  0.183  0.187  0.082 
compempl  -0.1607724  -0.2249483  -0.5414497  0.0710489 
  0.547  0.686  0.664  0.366 
labprod  0.0260017  0.0372911  -0.0211006  -0.1218* 
  0.116  0.148  0.137  0.070 
emprotection   3.495648 0.1565795 3.2397* 0.1341908 1.3422* 0.5974475 
   2.133 1.465 1.965 1.403 0.769 0.678 
tradeundens   -0.0350994 0.0180615 -0.0785538 0.1419507 -0.2605*** -0.1323688 
   0.218 0.136 0.204 0.136 0.100 0.087 
taxwedge   0.5282** -0.0088802 0.2055315 -0.1045205 -0.073741 -0.0959822 
   0.259 0.145 0.212 0.140 0.091 0.078 
Sargan test 
[1]
 209.8 (.33) 201.1 (.17) 211.4 (.25) 197.6 (.17) 193.9 (.15) 171.3 (.18) 217.2 (.07) 198.4 (.06) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -2.70 (.00) -2.36 (.01) -2.66 (.00) -2.36 (.01) -2.54 (.01) -2.36 (.01) -2.62 (.00) -2.26 (.02) 
 -0.11 (.90) -0.17 (.85) -0.14 (.88) -0.16 (.87) -0.13(.88) -0.12 (.90) -0.02 (.97) -0.19 (.84) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
country-specific time trend no no no no no no yes yes 
Obs (groups) 214 (10) 201 (10) 214 (10) 201 (10) 214 (10) 201 (10) 214 (10) 201 (10) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
Table [9]: Regional-level data. Variable definition and sources 
 
Label Variable Definition Units Source 
emprate  
Employment 
rate 
Ratio of the employed over working 
age population 
Ratio INE 
ESF 
EU transfers 
from the 
European Social 
Fund 
Current transfers from the EU to the 
regional government under the ESF 
programme (commitments) 
Share of GDP 
1995 2001 BADESPE; 2002 2010 Liquidacion 
presupuestos CCAA (database); 1987 1994 
Informe sobre la financiación de las CCAA 
(yearbook) 
DEC 
Decentralization 
ratio 
Ratio of per capita public 
expenditure run by the regional 
government over per capital public 
expenditure run by the central 
government 
ratio 
INE (population), sources of variable 
regionalexp, BADESPE and IGAE (databases) 
socialexp 
Social 
expenditure by 
the public 
regional 
administration 
Expenditure on social promotion: 
current transfers, unemployment 
protection, active labor market 
policies and housing subsidies 
Share of GDP 
2002/2010 Liquidación de presupuestos de las 
CC AA; 2000/2001 BADESPE; 1989/1999 
Anuario liquidación presupuestos de las CC 
AA (yearbook) 
regionalexp 
Total 
expenditure by 
the public 
regional 
administration 
Total final public expenditure at the 
regional level 
Share of GDP 
1984 2003 BADESPE; 2004-2010 Liquidación 
de los presupuestos de las CC AA 
lodgdppc 
Log of GDP per 
capita 
GDP per inhabitant in logarithmic 
form 
Log of data expressed in 
miles Euro 
INE 
growth 
Real economic 
growth 
Real GDP growth rate at constant 
prices 
Growth rate INE 
pop Population Population at 1st of January Miles people INE 
  
 
 
 
Table [10]: Regional-level data. Summary statistics. 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
employrate 374 45.56 6.17 32.10 59.97 
ESF 374 0.0007 0.0008 0.0000 0.0064 
socialexp 374 0.012 0.007 0.001 0.043 
regionalexp 374 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.31 
growth 374 0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.21 
log_pcincome 374 9.77 0.46 8.68 0.56 
Pop 374 2413.43 2108.82 261.10 8206.06 
DEC 374 0.56 0.30 0.10 1.61 
 
 
 
 
 
Table [11]: Regional-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. First differences.  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
          
emprateFD (t-1) 0.29669*** 0.2582*** 0.2954*** -0.02133 -0.05978 0.2888*** -0.02317 0.24939*** 0.2874*** 
 0.048 0.05 0.049 0.052 0.054 0.05 0.052 0.051 0.05 
ESF -42.81929  -60.43463 0.30949***  -41.92369 -26.793  -61.5065 
 79.62  95.14 57.48  81.54 68.652  97.58 
regionalexp -18.31914**  -18.1685*** 1.32009  -17.6380*** 1.62919  -17.4718*** 
 6.049  6.069 6.128  6.27 6.147  6.29 
socialexpFD  -10.67274   4.990548   -9.30725  
  26.716   19.349   27.695  
growth 20.00109*** 23.86864*** 20.02923*** 4.63420** 6.3332*** 20.34163*** 4.65453** 24.0308*** 20.37563*** 
 2.017 1.961 2.02 2.335 2.35541 2.086 2.337 2.041 2.09 
logGDPpc 0.64269* 0.5513248 0.6426* 0.9768*** 0.8926*** 0.5426574 0.9768*** 0.695698 0.541079 
 0.358 0.369 0.359 0.256 0.25082 0.515 0.256 0.566 0.516 
pop 0.00311*** 0.003078*** 0.00311*** 0.0026*** 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0026*** 0.0031*** 0.00322*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00081 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
DEC 2.8878*** 0.7893697 2.91037*** -1.52743 1.46633* 2.80804*** 1.5183 0.800659 2.83317*** 
 0.943 0.767 0.946 1.439 0.8768 0.966 1.44 0.79 0.969 
DEC*ESF   302.0347   451.5822   334.301 
   891.54   624.442   913.546 
Sargan test 
[1]
 376.3 (.32) 355.7 (.17) 375.7 (.32) 352.9 (.37) 327.5 (.28) 351.9 (.37) 358.2 (.35) 336.9 (.20) 357.6 (.34) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -3.60 (.00) -3.71 (.00) -3.60 (.00) -3.46 (.00) -3.59 (.00) -3.45 (.00) -3.60 (.00) -3.71 (.00) -3.59 (.00) 
 0.47 (.63) 0.014 (.98) 0.48 (.62) -1.04 (.29) -1.59 (.11) -1.06 (.28) 0.49 (.61) -0.02 (.98) 0.51 (.60) 
time dummies no no no yes yes yes no no no 
time trend common common common no no no unit specific unit specific unit specific 
Obs (groups) 374 (17) 340 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 340 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 340 (17) 374 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
 
 
 
  
Table [12]: Regional-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. Long-term coefficients 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
ESF 2141.246***  1522.248***  -52.98759  1371.349**  
 659.948  577.817  661.519  585.210  
regionalexp -46.4156***  -40.1278***  -22.66425  -69.4816***  
 12.770  11.493  19.148  22.482  
socialexp  -148.1698  -189.0279  -17.23847  -74.199 
  109.939  97.3720*  119.511  128.691 
growth 50.6254*** 66.8034*** 70.74835*** 87.7738***   60.6050*** 79.5136*** 
 15.317 16.160 15.979 16.14735   15.789 16.157 
loggdppc 5.61426*** 7.20931*** 1.868255 1.825594 4.8967*** 5.32197*** 2.735105 3.98802** 
 1.235 1.353 1.314 1.368 1.810 1.832 1.887 1.953 
pop 0.00311** 0.004093*** 0.0010185 .0010413 0.0003124 -.0009538 -0.00649* -.008508** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0013693 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
DEC 16.8580*** 9.81957*** 11.2758*** 4.79002** 11.5807* 3.528685 14.5228*** 5.9996*** 
 2.558 2.005 2.693 2.075 6.692 3.819 3.069 2.120 
Sargan test 
[1]
 286 (.74) 294.9 (.52) 285.2 (.76) 291.9 (.57) 311.5 (.17) 303.2 (.12) 259.0 (.93) 266.8 (.83) 
Autocorr. Test 
[2]
 -3.88 (.00) -3.79 (.00) -3.84 (.00) -3.82 (.00) -3.36 (.00) -3.34 (.00) -3.81 (.00) -3.79 (.00) 
 0.030 (.76) 0.27 (.78) -0.01(.98) -0.20 (.83) -1.14 (.13) -1.57 (.11) -0.09 (.92) -0.38 (.69) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
time trend no no common common no no unit specific unit specific 
Obs (groups) 323 (17) 323 (17) 323 (17) 323 (17) 340 (17) 323 (17) 323 (17) 323 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
[1]
 Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
[2]
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
 
 
 
 
  
Table [13]: Regional-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. Models with spatial autocorrelation: spatial lag model 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
*empratej 0.9011*** 0.92781*** 0.91320*** 0.9367*** -0.28635 -0.19174 0.9728*** 0.98504*** 
 0.041 0.038 0.043 0.040 0.361 0.367 0.036 0.033 
ESF 118.9499  140.452  -13.6046  62.89597  
 125.172  127.285  142.136  105.144  
regionalexp -8.7247**  -8.34265**  -21.5808***  -7.24755  
 4.180  4.201  5.597  5.401  
socialexp  -32.9307  -30.9189  -49.6579*  11.55977 
  24.253  24.375  28.852  25.385 
growth 3.375258 4.0927* 2.324373 3.185321 2.059334 2.565759 0.323256 1.556021 
 2.221 2.200 2.489 2.440 4.234 4.308 2.058 1.994 
logGDPpc 0.042175 0.062212 0.319364 0.320879 0.226355 0.294867 2.3874*** 2.5194*** 
 0.326 0.323 0.440 0.441 0.445 0.451 0.513 0.516 
pop 0.00136*** 0.00144*** 0.00149*** 0.00156*** 0.00202*** 0.00174*** -0.00072 -0.00088 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
DEC 2.7162** 1.3404* 2.819437 1.4879* 7.9131*** 2.2857** 0.965141 -0.11773 
 1.104 0.741 1.110 0.761 1.894 1.063 1.029 0.688 
F test group 664.9 (.00) 771.1 (.00) 581.7 (.00) 660.5 (.00) 169.9 (.00) 170.0 (.00) 328.3 (.00) 341.7 (.00) 
R2(adjusted) 0.446 0.421 0.421 0.400 0.297 0.302 0.480 0.506 
LM test spatial error 
autocor. 
1.327 (.24) 2.055 (.15) 1.291 (.25) 2.029 (.15) 0.302 (.58) 0.792 (.37) 0.901 (.34) 1.402 (.23) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
time trend no no common common no no unit specific unit specific 
Obs (groups) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
Table [14]: Regional-Level data. Determinants of unemployment rate. Models with spatial autocorrelation: spatial Durbin model 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
ESF -74.7411  -87.2116  -136.179  18.40425  
 188.592  187.280  139.111  186.911  
regionalexp -23.89***  -25.2345***  -30.685***  -11.9137  
 7.392  7.358  5.954  12.649  
socialexp  -28.1835  -52.5338  -104.11***  43.07685 
  39.444  38.387  29.632  43.753 
growth 4.917554 6.10981 4.490446 5.028613 2.440637 2.296018 6.978834 7.053327 
 5.731 6.073808 5.691 5.869 4.039 4.219 5.459 5.177 
logGDPpc 1.2477** 0.179485 1.6513** 1.1781* 1.7117*** 1.5380*** 3.1471*** 3.8189*** 
 0.617 0.635885 0.634 0.644 0.506 0.537 0.865 0.823 
pop 0.00251*** 0.00237*** 0.0027*** 0.0028*** 0.00269*** 0.0015*** 0.00064 0.001239 
 0.001 0.000694 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
DEC 7.2481*** 3.6295** 7.7944*** 3.6078** 8.7259*** 0.2406 2.850438 0.198503 
 2.442 1.44296 2.434 1.393 2.099 1.142 3.585 1.691 
*ESFj -2228.4***  -2124.04***  -3145.0***  -1682.36***  
 529.271  527.094  972.354  569.044  
*regionalexpj -96.065***  -73.868***  -197.24***  -22.815  
 22.884  24.429  34.531  28.127  
*socialexpj  163.0003  408.66***  -830.6***  616.7*** 
  99.36848  107.326  165.606  103.883 
*growthj 1.842613 24.5054*** 0.740433 17.5622** 2.598541 1.737646 8.447485 17.1847*** 
 7.785 7.108716 7.741 6.998 28.481 29.870 7.730 6.159 
*logGDPpcj 7.7502*** 2.7347*** 14.197*** 18.4518*** 6.5968* 6.17938 13.5800*** 22.5377*** 
 1.211 0.957912 2.873 3.212 3.716 3.950 3.004 3.172 
*popj 0.000403 0.002055 0.003051 0.0045* 0.003923 -0.0052* 0.0075** 0.004126 
 0.002 0.00258 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
*DECj 13.2744*** 8.5803*** 10.3005*** 5.5415*** 33.8258*** -13.327** 10.1220** 6.5521*** 
 3.241 1.875568 3.435 1.906 10.686 6.502 4.265 2.052 
F test group 184.6 (.00) 192.9 (.00) 173.3 (.00) 190.4 (.00) 171.8 (.00) 166.1 (.00) 89.8 (.00) 107.0 (.00) 
R2(adjusted) 0.282 0.202 0.263 0.182 0.303 0.357 0.480 0.444 
LM test spatial error autocor.  423.5 (.00) 370.8 (.00) 381.1 (.00) 253.9 (.00) 0.001 (.97) 0.007 (.93) 421.2 (.00) 294.6 (.00) 
time dummies no no no no yes yes no no 
time trend no no common common no no unit specific unit specific 
Obs (groups) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 374 (17) 
 
